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I. INTRODUCTION
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) largely governs the body of law regulating immigration in the United States.
Provisions of the INA describe classes of noncitizens who are inadmissible and removable, including any noncitizen who is convicted of
an aggravated felony defined by the statute. The definition of “aggravated felony” encompasses a range of offenses from very serious to
relatively minor offenses and imposes harsh consequences for a
noncitizen convicted of qualifying crimes. Some recent U.S. Supreme
Court decisions acknowledge the harshness of these consequences
and are encouraging a more narrow reach for this term, setting the
stage for Congress to revisit the aggravated felony definition.
This Note will suggest restructuring the INA so that its penal
provisions produce just results for noncitizens convicted of aggravated felonies. Part II of this Note will consider the legal history of the
INA, including the expansion of the term aggravated felony, and the
restriction of judicial and discretionary review by the U.S. Attorney
General. Part III will characterize judicial interpretation of immigration laws, consider the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Moncrieffe v. Holder, and present holdings from the Supreme Court
and U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals that have collectively shaped im* Juris Doctor Candidate 2015, Florida State University College of Law. I would like
to thank my family for their endless love and support. I would also like to thank Professor
Elwin Griffith, Florida State University College of Law, for his expert guidance and feedback.
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migration law. Part IV will consider the problem with the broad aggravated felony definition and the consequences of characterizing
crimes as such, including the societal impact that mandatory deportation has on noncitizens and their families. Part IV will also consider whether Moncrieffe v. Holder might open the door for restricting
the offenses that qualify as aggravated felonies. Part V will consider
whether the legislature should revise the definition of aggravated
felony, or whether it should provide more discretionary review to
determine whether certain offenses warrant removal.
This Note does not advocate for the rights of criminal aliens to stay
in the United States when doing so would threaten the interests of
justice and the safety of citizens. Rather, it advocates the use of discretion to individually consider immigration offenses before mandating
removal and the revision of the current statutory scheme, so that minor offenses are not penalized with disproportionate consequences.
II. IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT
A. Legal History
The primary sources of immigration law are the INA, provisions in
treaties and other statutes, federal case law, and agency regulations.1
The goals of this complex body of law include “controlling the entry of
aliens[;] . . . establishing the grounds and procedures for their expulsion or, alternatively, relief from expulsion; providing for administrative and judicial review of the proceedings involved; and creating civil
and criminal liability as a means of enforcing controls.”2 Imposing
criminal liability on aliens is among the most serious concerns of the
federal government, which implemented measures for excluding and
removing criminal aliens early in the formation of immigration law.3
Since the nineteenth century, barriers have restricted the entry of
criminals into the United States; convicts and prostitutes were
among the first classes of aliens deemed excludable.4 By the early
twentieth century, Congress enacted statutes that expanded the classes of excludable aliens and the grounds for removal of aliens who
were already in the United States.5
The Immigration Act of 1917 included, for the first time, a list of
grounds for removal “in response to public outcry against the activi1. 6 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 1.02[3][a] (Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2013).
2. Id. § 1.02[1].
3. See id.
4. S. REP. NO. 81-1515, at 335 (1950).
5. Adriane Meneses, Comment, The Deportation of Lawful Permanent Residents for
Old and Minor Crimes: Restoring Judicial Review, Ending Retroactivity, and Recognizing
Deportation as Punishment, 14 SCHOLAR 767, 778 (2012).
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ties of noncitizen criminals.”6 This Act specifically listed “aliens sentenced to serve one or more years of imprisonment for commission in
this country within 5 years of entry of crimes involving moral turpitude, or sentenced more than once to such a term of imprisonment for
the commission of such crimes at any time after entry.”7 Other laws
mandated removal for aliens convicted of drug trafficking, an offense
of particular concern to Congress.8 In 1947, the Senate approved a
resolution allowing for a comprehensive investigation of the immigration system and subsequently enacted the INA.9 The INA has developed substantially since 1952 to address changing concerns.10
B. Enlargement of the Aggravated Felony Provision
In 1988, Congress enacted the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988
(ADAA) to “prevent the manufacturing, distribution, and use of
illegal drugs, and for other purposes.”11 The ADAA amended the INA
to include a definition of aggravated felonies to serve as grounds for
deportation. 12 The ADAA defined three categories of offenses as
aggravated felonies: murder, drug trafficking, and firearm trafficking. 13 After its introduction, the term aggravated felony expanded
to include more serious and less serious offenses through amendments in the Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT 90),14 the Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994,15 the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1966 (AEDPA),16 and the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 (IIRAIRA).17
IMMACT 90 amended the INA to “change the level, and preference system for admission, of immigrants to the United States, and
to provide for administrative naturalization, and for other purpos-

6. 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 1, § 71.05[1][a]; see also S. REP. NO. 81-1515, at
388-89 (discussing the first time an elaborate list of causes for deportation was
statutorily enumerated).
7. S. REP. NO. 81-1515, at 389.
8. See id. at 408.
9. See id. at 1; see also 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 1, § 71.05[1][a].
10. 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 1, § 71.05[1][a].
11. Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified as amended in scattered titles of
the U.S. Code).
12. § 7342, 102 Stat. at 4469-70 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)).
13. Id.
14. Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 501(a)(2), 104 Stat. 4978, 5048 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)).
15. Pub. L. No. 103-416, § 222(a), 108 Stat. 4305, 4320-22 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)).
16. Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 440(b), 110 Stat. 1214, 1277-78 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)).
17. Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 321(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-627 to -28 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)).
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es.”18 The provision of IMMACT 90 relating to aggravated felonies
added new categories of crimes to the existing list of qualifying offenses, including illicit trafficking in controlled substances, crimes
related to money laundering, crimes of violence, and offenses in violation of federal, state, or foreign law.19 Several years later, the Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act provided the largest expansion of the classes of offenses characterized as aggravated
felonies to include numerous offenses, such as theft and fraud.20
AEDPA and IIRAIRA also impacted the definition of aggravated
felony. “The four listed purposes of IIRAIRA are to: (1) ‘increase control over immigration to the United States,’ (2) expedite the removal
of aliens, ‘especially criminal aliens,’ (3) reduce abuse of asylum and
parole, and (4) effect a reduction in the use of welfare and government benefits by aliens.” 21 The purposes of AEDPA are “ ‘to deter
terrorism, provide justice for victims, provide for an effective death
penalty, and for other purposes.’ ”22 These Acts modified the aggravated felony definition by lowering the sentencing requirement from
five years to one year, which allowed the provision to encompass
crimes characterized as misdemeanors under state law.23 The phrase
“aggravated felony” is a term of art that includes non-felonies “when
the language of a particular subparagraph specifically includes misdemeanors.”24 “The controlling factor is the sentence imposed,”25 notwithstanding the fact that Congress expanded the term “conviction”
to include any reference to imprisonment or sentence, regardless of
its execution, deferred adjudication, probation, suspension, or expungement.26 Even an indeterminate sentence constitutes an aggravated felony “as long as the law defines an indeterminate sentence as
one that exceeds one year.”27
Today, the definition of aggravated felony includes more than fifty
classes of crimes imposing numerous penalties and restrictions
against convicted noncitizens.28 The legislature expanded the defini-

18. Immigration Act of 1990.
19. Id. § 501 (amending the definition of “aggravated felony” within 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)).
20. § 222(a), 108 Stat. at 4320-22.
21. Meneses, supra note 5, at 825 (quoting S. REP. NO. 104-249, at 2 (1996)).
22. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214.
23. See Meneses, supra note 5, at 782.
24. 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 1, § 71.05[2][b].
25. Id.
26. See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104208, § 322(a)(1), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-628 to -29 (1996) (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A)-(B)).
27. 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 1, § 71.05[2][b].
28. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2012); 6 GORDON, supra note 1, § 71.05[2][b].
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tion of the term four times in the decade after it was created. 29
Through these amendments, the initial concerns over the serious
crimes of murder, drug trafficking and firearm trafficking gave way
to less serious crimes that are neither aggravated, nor felonies.30
C. Fitting State Offenses into the Federal Scheme
The aggravated felony provision encompasses offenses in violation
of federal or state law.31 “[W]hether a state conviction can be considered an aggravated felony for immigration purposes is best determined according to a uniform rule based on set federal standards.”32
In most cases, courts employ the categorical approach in determining
whether a state offense is comparable to an aggravated felony under
the federal scheme.33 This approach restricts courts to “look only to
the fact that the defendant had been convicted of crimes falling within certain categories, and not to the facts underlying the prior convictions.”34 Under this approach, courts must determine “whether ‘the
state statute defining the crime of conviction’ categorically fits within
the ‘generic’ federal definition of a corresponding aggravated felony.”35 This approach has been widely accepted in immigration law,
both because the Attorney General established this standard for convictions of noncitizens, and because the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) set this as the standard for removal proceedings.36
Despite the common usage of the categorical approach, there are
some immigration cases in which this approach does not achieve the
best compromise between federal and state offenses. In some instances, a departure from the categorical approach is warranted and
courts should employ a modified categorical approach. Such cases
occur, for example, when a noncitizen is convicted of a crime that is
similar to, but broader than the generic crime, making it uncertain
whether the offense satisfied the elements of the generic crime.37 Using the modified categorical approach, courts may go beyond the
29. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)); Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-416, 108 Stat. 4305 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)); Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100690, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified as amended in scattered titles of the U.S. Code).
30. Meneses, supra note 5, at 781.
31. § 1101(a)(43).
32. 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 1, § 71.05[2][b].
33. Id.
34. Id. (quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990)).
35. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1684 (2013) (quoting Gonzales v. DuenasAlvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 186 (2007)).
36. See id. at 1685; 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 1, § 71.05[2][b] n.450.1.
37. 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 1, § 71.05[2][b].
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statutory language and look into the details of a conviction record to
determine whether a state offense constitutes an aggravated felony.38
D. Restriction of Discretionary Review
The changing landscape of immigration law and the expansion of
the aggravated felony definition have been accompanied by a restriction on judicial review in deportation cases. The Immigration Act
of 1917 created Judicial Recommendation Against Deportation
(JRAD), giving sentencing judges the ultimate authority to determine
that a noncitizen shall not be deported.39 Judicial discretion was restricted in 1952 and eliminated in the 1990s.40 IMMACT 90 restricted
the ability of immigration judges to grant discretionary relief in removal proceedings, which AEDPA entirely eliminated in 1996. 41
AEDPA added that “any final order of deportation against an alien
who is deportable by reason of [certain enumerated criminal grounds]
shall not be subject to review by any court.”42 The limitation on judicial review eliminated any ability of an immigration judge to consider
a noncitizen’s case and determine that they qualify for some form of
discretionary relief from removal.
The INA does provide several possibilities for waivers of deportation. For example, a noncitizen may be granted a full and unconditional pardon by the President of the United States or by the governor of any state.43 In addition, the INA includes a provision granting
the Attorney General the discretion to cancel removal of permanent
residents or certain nonpermanent residents deemed inadmissible or
deportable; but, such discretion is barred altogether in cases where
the offender has been convicted of an aggravated felony.44 The effect
of deportability, the limitation on judicial review of removal, and the
limited ability of noncitizens to seek cancellation of removal are the
obstacles that noncitizens face once their misconducts are categorized
as aggravated felonies.45

38. Id.
39. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1479 (2010); Meneses, supra note 5, at 782-83.
40. Meneses, supra note 5, at 783.
41. Id.
42. 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 1, § 104.13[3] (quoting Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 § 440(a)).
43. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(vi) (2012).
44. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2012).
45. 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 1, § 71.05[2][c].
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III. AGGRAVATED FELONY CASES
A. Supreme Court Cases Shaping the Law
Federal court decisions have shaped the law relating to the
deportability of criminal aliens as the statutory framework has
evolved. Numerous decisions from the Supreme Court and circuit
courts of appeals have involved noncitizens convicted of aggravated
felonies. In less than a decade, the Supreme Court decided three
cases involving drug offenses, each analyzing “whether the Government has properly characterized a low-level drug offense as ‘illicit
trafficking in a controlled substance,’ and thus an ‘aggravated felony.’ ” 46 Additionally, the Court decided one case that considered
whether a fraud conviction was an aggravated felony. 47 Through
these decisions, the Court has established precedent that provides
guidance to lower courts.
In 2006, the Court decided Lopez v. Gonzales and determined that
a noncitizen’s conviction of a state felony ultimately was not an aggravated felony. 48 The defendant was a legal permanent resident
when he was convicted in South Dakota of a felony charge of aiding
and abetting the possession of cocaine.49 The INA provides that illicit
trafficking in a controlled substance, which the CSA makes punishable by more than one year in prison, is an aggravated felony.50 South
Dakota law equated the aiding and abetting charge with possession,
so the defendant was convicted of a felony, which was characterized
as a misdemeanor under the CSA.51 The government argued that the
felony conviction should be treated as an aggravated felony under the
INA, but the Court disagreed.52 It reasoned that Congress would not
have created a statutory scheme of felonies and misdemeanors if it
intended courts to ignore the scheme in favor of state punishment.53
The Court held that a state offense only equates to a federal felony if
it proscribes conduct punishable as a felony under federal law.54 The
defendant, therefore, was not disqualified from discretionary cancellation of removal.55
Three years later, in Nijhawan v. Holder, a noncitizen was convicted of “conspiring to commit mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud,

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1693 (2013).
See Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 32 (2009).
See Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 60 (2006).
Id. at 51.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 53.
Id.
Id. at 54-55.
Id. at 60.
See id.
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and money laundering.”56 The INA makes punishable as an aggravated felony “an offense that . . . involves fraud or deceit in which the
loss to the victim . . . exceeds $10,000.”57 The jury made no finding as
to the amount involved in the fraud convictions, but the defendant
stipulated at sentencing to an amount exceeding $10,000.58 The Court
considered whether the amount required for characterization as an
aggravated felony under the INA referred to “an element of a fraud
statute or to the factual circumstances surrounding commission of
the crime on a specific occasion.” 59 This difference would affect
whether the Court should adopt the typical categorical approach, or
whether it should adopt a circumstance-specific approach when determining whether the offense constitutes an aggravated felony. 60
Despite the Court’s emphasis that the categorical approach is necessary when considering generic crimes, the Court adopted the circumstance-specific approach in this case because of the statutorythreshold requirement. 61 The Court upheld the aggravated felony
conviction against the defendant, because there was clear and convincing evidence that the conviction involved losses considerably
greater than the amount required by the statute.62
In 2010, the Court decided Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, which
involved a legal permanent resident who faced deportation after
committing two misdemeanor drug offenses in Texas.63 The federal
law provided that “recidivist simple possession”—a repeat conviction
for a simple possession offense—is punishable as a felony with a
prison sentence of up to two years, making it an aggravated felony.64
Because of this categorization, the government sought to deport the
defendant after his second conviction for possessing a single tablet of
anti-anxiety medication without a prescription.65 The defendant did
not contest his removability, but argued he was eligible for cancellation of removal.66 The Court had to determine whether the mere possibility of a two-year prison sentence was sufficient to constitute an
aggravated felony.67 The Court used a “commonsense conception” of
the statutory language and determined that possession of one Xanax
tablet did not constitute the offense of trafficking in a controlled sub-

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

557 U.S. 29, 32 (2009).
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 34.
See id. at 36.
See id. at 42-43.
560 U.S. 563 (2010).
Id. at 567-68.
Id. at 570.
Id.
Id.
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stance.68 The Court held that the relevant statutory hook is an actual
conviction of a crime punishable as a felony under federal law, not
the mere possibility that a felony conviction could have resulted.69
B. Moncrieffe v. Holder
Most recently in 2013, the Court issued its decision in Moncrieffe
v. Holder, considering for a third time in seven years whether the
government “properly characterized a low-level drug offense as ‘illicit
trafficking in a controlled substance,’ and thus an ‘aggravated felony.’ ”70 The defendant in Moncrieffe was a Jamaican citizen who legally moved to the United States in 1984 when he was three years
old.71 In 2007, the defendant was arrested for possessing 1.3 grams of
marijuana and pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana with intent
to distribute, a felony under Georgia state law.72 As a first-time offender, the trial court required the defendant to complete five years
of probation for the offense, after which the charge would be expunged.73 In addition, “the trial court withheld entering a judgment
of conviction or imposing any term of imprisonment.”74
The government later sought to deport the defendant for conviction of an aggravated felony, because the offense was punishable by
up to five years imprisonment and considered a felony under the
CSA.75 An immigration judge ordered the defendant’s removal, and
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed.76 The defendant
filed a petition for review to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and
asserted that § 841(b)(4) of the CSA makes distribution of “a small
amount of marijuana for no remuneration” a misdemeanor offense.77
The Fifth Circuit denied the petition, holding that the defendant’s
conviction under Georgia law was the equivalent of a federal felony,
and that “ ‘the default sentencing range for a marijuana distribution
offense is the CSA’s felony provision, § 841(b)(1)(D), rather than the
misdemeanor provision.’ ”78
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the narrow issue
of whether a state statute criminalizing conduct that meets both felony and misdemeanor provisions of the CSA is an offense that “ ‘pro68. Id. at 573.
69. See id.
70. 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1693 (2013).
71. Id. at 1683.
72. Id.; see also Ga. Code Ann., § 16-13-30(h) (making it a felony to possess a controlled substance with intent to distribute).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. Id.
78. Id. (quoting Moncrieffe v. Holder, 662 F.3d 387, 392 (5th Cir. 2011), rev’d, 133 S.
Ct. 1678 (2013) (citing Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 392 (2006))).
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scribes conduct punishable as a felony under’ the CSA.”79 Under the
Georgia statute, the defendant pleaded guilty to a felony, but the
record of conviction did not necessarily establish that the defendant’s
conduct would constitute a felony under the CSA.80
Justice Sotomayor wrote the opinion for the Court and described
the severity of the consequences for noncitizens convicted of aggravated felonies under the INA, including deportation and ineligibility
for discretionary relief from removal. 81 The Court maintained the
standard that “a noncitizen’s conviction of an offense that the [CSA]
makes punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment will be
counted as an ‘aggravated felony’ ” for convictions under state or federal law, but state offenses must be punishable as felonies under federal law.82 The Court employed the categorical approach to determine
whether the state offense equated to the generic definition of a federal felony,83 explaining:
By “generic,” we mean the offenses must be viewed in the abstract,
to see whether the state statute shares the nature of the federal offense that serves as a point of comparison. Accordingly, a state offense is a categorical match with a generic federal offense only if a
conviction of the state offense “ ‘necessarily’ involved . . . facts
equating to [the] generic [federal offense].”84

This approach required the Court to ignore the facts underlying the
case, assume that the conviction was for the least severe acts criminalized under the state statute, and then determine whether the
crime fit the definition of the generic federal offense.85 In cases where
a state statute contains several different crimes, each described separately, “a court may determine which particular offense the noncitizen was convicted of by examining the charging document and jury
instructions, or in the case of a guilty plea, the plea agreement, plea
colloquy,” or something similar.86
The Court applied the categorical approach in Moncrieffe, because
“ ‘illicit trafficking in a controlled substance’ is a ‘generic crime.’ ”87
To satisfy the categorical approach, the state drug offense “must
‘necessarily’ proscribe conduct that is an offense under the CSA, and
the CSA must ‘necessarily’ prescribe felony punishment for that conduct.”88 The primary issue before the Court was whether the defend79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 1684 (quoting Lopez, 549 U.S. at 60).
See id. at 1685.
See id. at 1682.
Id. at 1683.
See id. at 1684.
Id. (quoting Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 24 (2005)).
Id. (citing Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 137 (2010)).
See id. (citing Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 35 (2009)).
Id. at 1685 (quoting Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 37).
Id.
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ant’s conviction under Georgia law for possession of marijuana with
intent to distribute was “necessarily” a felony under the CSA.89 Although possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute is
a felony, the Court was required to consider what punishment the
CSA imposed for the offense.90
Upon examining the punishment provisions within the CSA,
the Court cited the statute and highlighted its exception.91 Section
841(a) describes the offense of unlawful possession under which
the defendant was convicted, and subsection (b) describes its
respective punishment:
Subsection (b)(1)(D) provides that if a person commits a violation
of subsection (a) involving “less than 50 kilograms of marihuana,”
then “such person shall, except as provided in paragraphs (4) and
(5) of this subsection, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of
not more than 5 years,” i.e., as a felon. But one of the exceptions is
important here. Paragraph (4) provides, “Notwithstanding paragraph (1)(D) of this subsection, any person who violates subsection
(a) of this section by distributing a small amount of marihuana for
no remuneration shall be treated as” a simple drug possessor, 21
U.S.C. § 844, which for our purposes means as a misdemeanant. 92

The distinguishing factor in Moncrieffe was that the defendant’s
conviction fell within the statutory exception that created two categories of punishment for possession with intent to distribute under the
CSA, which meant the state conviction could match both felony and
misdemeanor punishment.93 Under the Georgia statute, a conviction
for possession with intent to distribute marijuana does not reveal
whether the conviction is for a small amount or for no remuneration.94 Since a conviction for an aggravated felony requires that the
state statute describe an offense that is “necessarily” punishable as a
felony under the CSA, the defendant’s conviction in Moncrieffe was
not an aggravated felony.95
The Fifth Circuit believed the felony provision of the CSA to be
the default provision,96 but the Court felt this would ignore the legislature’s intent in creating separate punishments within the statute.97
The Court held that the conviction under state law was not for an
aggravated felony under the INA.98 The Court made clear its prefer89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

See id.
Id.
Id. at 1686.
Id. at 1685-86.
See id. at 1686.
See id.
See id. at 1687.
Id. at 1688.
See id. at 1689.
See id.
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ence to “err on the side of underinclusiveness because ambiguity in
criminal statutes referenced by the INA must be construed in the
noncitizen’s favor.”99 In addition, the Court declared that it would be
unreasonable to characterize conduct as an aggravated felony when
that conduct is characterized as a misdemeanor under federal statutes.100 Although the defendant was still subject to deportation for his
conviction, the Court’s holding eliminated the mandatory sanctions
that would have been imposed under the INA if the conviction were
categorized as an aggravated felony.101
C. Moncrieffe Dissent
Justice Alito dissented in Moncrieffe, claiming that the Court did
not use a pure categorical approach in deciding the case and asserting a need to depart from the pure categorical approach under the
specific circumstances. 102 Justice Alito presented a hypothetical in
which an alien found to possess two marijuana cigarettes with the
intent to give one to a friend would be regarded as having committed
an aggravated felony under the pure categorical approach.103 “[T]his
classification is plainly out of step with the CSA’s assessment of the
severity of the alien’s crime because under the CSA the alien could
obtain treatment as a misdemeanant.”104 Justice Alito agreed with
the majority that the alien should not be classified as an aggravated
felon, but he declared that it is necessary to depart from a pure categorical approach in order to avoid this result.105 Ultimately, he took
exception with the Court’s reasoning rather than with its result.106
Justice Alito sided with the government’s proposed remedy, which
provided that noncitizens should be given the opportunity in immigration proceedings to show that their conviction involved a small
amount of marijuana for no remuneration.107 The majority disagreed
with this result, asserting that this sort of post hoc investigation
would invite re-litigation of past convictions in mini-trials, which is
precisely what the categorical approach aims to prevent.108 As Justice
Alito pointed out, the categorical approach would not be best in cases
like Moncrieffe, because some state crimes are so broadly defined
that they encompass very serious and less serious crimes. Although
99. Id. at 1693; see Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 581 (2010); Leocal v.
Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004).
100. Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1693.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 1699 (Alito, J., dissenting).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1699-1700.
105. Id. at 1700.
106. See id.
107. Id. at 1690 (majority opinion).
108. See id.
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the INA aims to identify categories of criminal conduct that pose a
particularly high danger to society, its goal is not furthered by categorizing defendants, like the one in Moncrieffe, as aggravated felons.109 Justice Alito supported a departure from the categorical approach, much like the Court embraced in prior cases, and supported a
kind of modified categorical approach, declaring, “it is appropriate to
look beyond the elements of the state offense and to rely as well on
facts that were admitted in state court.”110
D. Circuit Court Cases Applying the Law
In light of decisions by the Supreme Court, various circuit courts
have dealt with similar issues involving noncitizens convicted of aggravated felonies. Notable cases show the outer limits reached by the
aggravated felony provision and the widely accepted rule that misdemeanor offenses in state law can constitute aggravated felonies.
Circuit court decisions show how this definition extends from petit
larceny, to pointing a firearm at another person, to aggravated criminal sexual contact.111
In United States v. Pacheco, the Second Circuit announced: “In the
case before us, we deal with the question of whether Congress can
make the word ‘misdemeanor’ mean ‘felony.’ As will be seen, we hold
that it can.”112 Pacheco involved a noncitizen who was convicted of
several misdemeanors in Rhode Island for which he received suspended one-year sentences.113 The Second Circuit held that he had
been convicted of a single, aggravated felony.114 Similarly, in United
States v. Christopher, the Eleventh Circuit upheld a lower court’s
finding that the defendant’s misdemeanor shoplifting offense constituted an aggravated felony, because that court imposed a twelvemonth, albeit suspended, sentence.115 The Eleventh Circuit considered the length of the sentence imposed to be the controlling factor.116
Additionally, in United States v. Graham, the Third Circuit upheld a
lower court’s finding that a petit larceny conviction constituted an
aggravated felony.117

109. See id. (Alito, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 1701.
111. See, e.g., Cole v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 712 F.3d 517 (11th Cir. 2013); Restrepo v. Att’y
Gen., 617 F.3d 787 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Graham, 169 F.3d 787 (3d Cir. 1999).
112. United States v. Pacheco, 225 F.3d 148, 149 (2d Cir. 2000).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. United States v. Christopher, 239 F.3d 1191, 1193-94 (11th Cir. 2001).
116. Id. at 1193.
117. Graham, 169 F.3d at 793.
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IV. THE PROBLEM
A. Overbroad Aggravated Felony Provision
The laws expanding the aggravated felony definition have a common goal of protecting U.S. citizens. 118 The initial concern that
prompted the creation the aggravated felony provision in the INA
was protection from noncitizens convicted of murder, drug trafficking, and firearm trafficking.119 Subsequent amendments to the INA
provided protections from noncitizens engaged in crimes of violence,
theft, and fraud.120 The most recent changes to the statute aimed to
expedite the removal of criminal aliens, deter terrorism, and provide
justice for victims.121 These changes serve societal interests by characterizing offenses as aggravated felonies and imposing punishment
for serious criminal conduct in furtherance of a worthy goal.
The expansion of the classes of crimes characterized as aggravated
felonies, however, begs an inquiry into whether the definition of aggravated felony is overbroad. It may be the case, for example, that
amidst the growing fear of terrorism, Congress had a growing concern about getting rid of criminal aliens in the United States and
equated all noncitizens to “terrorist aliens.”122 AEDPA and IIRAIRA,
which were enacted primarily to deter terrorism, had the largest impact on the aggravated felony definition.123 The concern driving the
bills could have led Congress to draft an over-inclusive statute in
response to the perceived problem of having criminal aliens in the
country. “The aggravated felony provision now appears to include a
number of crimes that may not seem deserving of their menacing
label, such as petty theft, perjury, and misdemeanor assault and bat-

118. See, e.g., Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43));
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)); Immigration and Nationality Technical
Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-416, 108 Stat. 4305 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)); Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100690, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified as amended in scattered titles of the U.S. Code).
119. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.
120. See Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994; Immigration
Act of 1990.
121. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996; Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.
122. See Aarti Kohli, Does the Crime Fit the Punishment?: Recent Judicial Actions
Expanding the Rights of Noncitizens, 2 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 1, 6 (2011).
123. See Illegal Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1996; Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996; see also Meneses, supra note 5, at 825.
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tery.”124 The effects of the expansions seem to extend beyond the purposes motivating the amendments.125
B. Harsh Consequences for Conviction
The INA declares that “[a]ny alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable.”126 Deportability makes it possible for the federal government to initiate removal
proceedings against a noncitizen, yet in many instances, a noncitizen
has various remedies to prevent actual removal. The alien may apply for a waiver, seek cancellation of removal by the Attorney General, or apply for asylum; but an alien convicted of an aggravated
felony under the INA is barred from almost all forms of relief.127 The
only available relief is a full pardon by the President or a state governor. 128 This provision removes the Attorney General’s discretion
and states: “The Attorney General may cancel removal in the case of
an alien who is . . . deportable from the United States if the alien . . . has not been convicted of an aggravated felony.”129 Furthermore, “an alien who has been convicted of an aggravated felony shall
be considered to have been convicted of a particularly serious crime,”
meaning the alien is presumed to be a danger to the community of
the United States and is ineligible to apply for asylum.130 Thus, aliens
convicted of aggravated felonies are deportable with no reasonable
forms of relief, which is the practical equivalent of mandatory removal.
In addition to mandatory removal, the consequences of requiring
deportation for an aggravated felony conviction include: (1) mandatory detention during removal proceedings; (2) a permanent bar
against re-entry into the United States; (3) a bar against naturalization; and (4) enhanced sentences for illegal re-entry after deportation.131 Furthermore, the aggravated felony provision applies retroactively and may have consequences on old convictions.132 These consequences do not solely impact the criminal alien but very often affect
the alien’s family.133 Human Rights Watch estimates that over 1 million people in the United States lost a family member to deportation
between 1997 and 2007, many of whom are citizen children or spous-

124. Iris Bennett, The Unconstitutionality of Nonuniform Immigration Consequences of
“Aggravated Felony” Convictions, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1696, 1699 (1999).
125. See Meneses, supra note 5, at 825.
126. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012).
127. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(vi), 1229b(a)(3), 1158(b)(2)(A)-(B) (2012).
128. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(vi).
129. § 1229b(a)(3).
130. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i) (2012).
131. Bennett, supra note 124, at 1701-02.
132. Id. at 1702.
133. Meneses, supra note 5, at 777.
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es of noncitizens. 134 The restriction on re-entry also tremendously
impacts aliens with families in the United States by eliminating any
opportunity to be reunited in this country.135
According to estimates by the Department of Homeland Security,
160,000 convicted criminal aliens were deported in 2010, mostly due
to convictions for drug offenses, immigration offenses, and criminal
vehicular-traffic offenses. 136 “According to Human Rights Watch, of
those persons deported for criminal offenses between 1997 and 2007,
seventy-two percent were deported for committing non-violent
crimes, and another fourteen percent were deported for offenses that
had the potential to cause harm but did not.”137 Deportation carries
serious penal consequences for noncitizens138 and others in the United
States community.139 Thus, competing concerns for safety of the American people and unity among the families of noncitizens call for careful
consideration of the impact of expanded laws that may overreach the
intent of the legislature and impact important societal values.
C. Effect of Supreme Court Decisions
The fact that the Supreme Court has repeatedly addressed the
issue of whether a noncitizen’s criminal conduct constitutes an aggravated felony indicates the need for a better understanding of the
purposes of the INA in order to appropriately implement its provisions. The CSA and the INA, for example, enforce punishment
against the serious crime of illicit trafficking in a controlled substance. 140 “Large-scale marijuana distribution is a major source of
income for some of the world’s most dangerous drug cartels.”141 The
CSA and INA aim to prevent and punish such large-scale drug distribution, but the goals of these statutes are not to impose serious
consequences on crimes that are “out of step with the CSA’s assessment of the severity of the alien’s crime[.]” 142 Mandating removal
without judicial review, or without possibility for cancellation of re134. See id.
135. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii); Bennett, supra note 124, at 1701-02; Meneses,
supra note 5, at 822; see also Deportations Under ’96 Law Take Toll on Families,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 18, 2007), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/11683008/ns/us_newslife/t/deportations-under-law-take-toll-families/#.U3lTTV7A2d8.
136. Meneses, supra note 5, at 773.
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). In Padilla, the Supreme Court
ruled that defense counsel was required to inform noncitizen defendants of the deportation
consequences of entering into a plea agreement. Id. at 369. The Court refused to
distinguish between direct and collateral consequences in the immigration context, recognizing that deportation is an integral part of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizens. Id. at 366.
139. Meneses, supra note 5, at 777.
140. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).
141. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1696 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting).
142. See id. at 1699.
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moval of a noncitizen convicted of possession of a small amount of
marijuana with intent to distribute, naturally falls beyond the serious crimes these statutes aim to criminalize.143 For this reason, the
Court in Moncrieffe determined that “[s]haring a small amount of
marijuana for no remuneration, let alone possession with intent to do
so, does not fit easily into the everyday understanding of trafficking,
which ordinarily . . . means some sort of commercial dealing;” and
decided that the defendant’s conduct did not warrant the harsh consequences of an aggravated felony conviction. 144 The Court in
Moncrieffe held for the third time that conduct the BIA and circuit
courts were willing to uphold as aggravated felonies was not, in fact,
equivalent to an aggravated felony.145
Consistency in applying the law, and clarity about interpreting
the law, is necessary, especially when the consequences of conviction
are so harsh. To that end, the recurrence of this issue before the
Court may be a result of the realization that harsh consequences are
not warranted by low-level drug offenses, or by less serious offenses
in general. The consideration of whether an offense falls within the
scope of an aggravated felony requires a comparison between state
and federal law. 146 “Different states, however, define the requisite
elements for . . . crimes differently.”147 This creates disparity and inconsistency as to what constitutes aggravated felonies in different
states.148 With many offenses qualifying as aggravated felonies while
falling outside the scope of serious conduct criminalized by the INA,
the issues before the Court may soon extend to other types of criminal conduct warranting mandatory removal without review. The
Court’s recent decisions encourage a legislative revision to restrict
the types of criminal conduct that can be reached by the INA’s aggravated felony definition or allow more discretion for judges deciding
the issue.149
V. THE SOLUTION
The recurring dispute over the definition of aggravated felony before the Supreme Court suggests a need both to revise this provision
143. See id.
144. Id. at 1693 (internal quotation marks omitted).
145. See id.; Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563 (2010); Lopez v. Gonzales, 549
U.S. 47 (2006).
146. See 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 1, § 71.05[2][b].
147. Bennett, supra note 124, at 1720.
148. See id.
149. Meneses, supra note 5, at 785 (“Recent Supreme Court holdings seem to be calling
for Congressional re-consideration of immigration laws, especially in areas in which criminal law intersects with immigration regulation.”); see also Kohli, supra note 122, at 14
(“[T]he Court seems to be reacting to Congress’ reduction of judicial and administrative
discretion with regard to deportations of criminal noncitizens over the last twenty years
and the concurrent sharp increase in removals.”).
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to prevent excessive punishment for less serious offenses, and to cure
disparate results in lower courts regarding what crimes constitute
aggravated felonies. These needs call for congressional restructuring
of the provisions of the INA defining aggravated felony and eliminating discretionary review of removal for noncitizens convicted of qualifying offenses. Narrowing the definition and granting judges discretion in reviewing immigration cases may be the appropriate solution
to improve the current, unclear state of immigration law.
The term aggravated felony denotes a serious threat to society and
suggests that removal without relief is proper for such offenses, but
the Court has agreed that deportation goes beyond being regulatory
and imposes severe penalties upon a noncitizen.150 There is a very
real threat to noncitizens, because this provision includes offenses
ranging from misdemeanors to murder and imposing a blanket sanction upon anyone convicted of an offense, regardless of its severity.151
Although U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals have embraced the fact that
this provision can include misdemeanors,152 the Supreme Court has
reversed those courts on three occasions, putting an end to deportation for some less serious crimes. These cases produced rulings that
share a view of leniency for criminal aliens.153
A major issue in all of these Supreme Court decisions was the reasonableness of equating state convictions to federal convictions. Because state statutes can be very broad, disparity arises when courts
are required to characterize state laws within the federal system.
The Court has created many guidelines for courts to consider when
determining whether offenses qualify as aggravated felonies. In
Lopez, the circuit court and BIA supported a finding that the state
felony should warrant removal as an aggravated felony, even though
the crime of aiding and abetting possession of cocaine only amounted
to a federal misdemeanor.154 However, the Court held that the state
offense must proscribe conduct punishable as a federal felony, implying that a consideration of conduct is essential. 155 In CarachuriRosendo, the Court emphasized that conviction of a crime that is
punishable as a federal felony is key. 156 These holdings, taken together, seem to instruct courts to determine whether the actual conviction under a state law that prescribes conduct punishable as a
felony equates to an aggravated felony. In Moncrieffe, the Court decided that a state felony should not be viewed in light of a default
150. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365 (2010).
151. See Meneses, supra note 5, at 798.
152. See, e.g., United States v. Pacheco, 225 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2000).
153. See Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013); Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder,
560 U.S. 563 (2010); Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47 (2006).
154. Lopez, 549 U.S. 47.
155. See id.
156. Carachuri-Rosendo, 560 U.S. 563.
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provision when the federal law includes dovetailing provisions prescribing both felony and misdemeanor punishment for an offense.157
These cases illustrate the complicated manner in which courts must
consider convictions. Although the Supreme Court found a way to
reconcile these holdings, this area of the law remains perplexing,
and judicial discretion may be the best resolution. In the wake of
broad state statutes and complicated instructions, judicial discretion
could be a meaningful and effective way of determining which part of
a law an alien violated, and whether that offense should constitute
an aggravated felony.
Furthermore, Justice Thomas’s dissent in Moncrieffe suggests that
the issue of aggravated felonies will continue to appear before the
Court if it keeps ignoring the plain meaning of statutes.158 If there is
concern about the Supreme Court misinterpreting statutory provisions in its application of this law, it follows that U.S. Circuit Courts
of Appeals will also have difficulty discerning the law. While it is
Congress’s prerogative to develop immigration law and policy, it
would be desirable to revise ambiguous laws in order to promote
more fair and consistent implementation. However, if Congress decides not to take action and narrow the scope of the aggravated felony provision, it should at least allow for judicial discretion to cure
ambiguities. According to long-standing canons of construction, ambiguous provisions should be viewed in a light favorable to the
noncitizen.159 Employing this canon would require judges to inquire
about the relevant circumstances surrounding the criminal conviction while determining whether removal is warranted.
The categorical approach is the accepted standard by which to fit
state offenses in the federal law,160 but the Supreme Court agreed
that sometimes employment of a modified categorical approach is
favorable.161 A modified categorical approach may, in fact, be better
suited than the categorical approach to determine whether most
criminal convictions are properly characterized as aggravated felonies. While the majority in Moncrieffe supported the use of the categorical approach to decide the issue, Justice Alito’s dissent asserted
that the Court did not actually employ a purely categorical approach.162 If this is true, then Monrieffe might, in effect, support the
use of a modified categorical approach. Even if Moncrieffe does not
157. Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. 1678.
158. See id. at 1694 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (referring to the “drug trafficking crime”
statute at issue in Moncrieffe).
159. Id. at 1693; see also Brian G. Slocum, The Immigration Rule of Lenity and Chevron Deference, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 515, 516 (2003).
160. Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1685.
161. Id. at 1701 (Alito, J., dissenting) (referencing several cases where the Court departed from the categorical approach).
162. See id. at 1697.
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provide this support, other decisions support a modified categorical
approach as an extension of the doctrine in favor of the alien. Nijhawan, for example, shows a necessity to depart from the categorical
approach in some cases to consider the facts and circumstances underlying the conviction.163 In Nijhawan, the Court drew a line to determine which offenses require consideration under a different approach:
The “aggravated felony” statute lists several of its “offenses” in language that must refer to generic crimes [such as] . . . “murder, rape,
or sexual abuse of a minor,” . . . “illicit trafficking in a controlled
substance,” . . . and “illicit trafficking in firearms or destructive devices.” . . . [H]owever, the “aggravated felony” statute . . . lists certain other “offenses” using language that almost certainly does not
refer to generic crimes but refers to specific circumstances.164

The INA does not define most of the crimes it labels as aggravated
felonies; rather, it refers to other statutes or uses everyday terms.165
Sometimes, it is not clear which crimes are generic for the purposes
of employing one approach over the other, which may support a universal adoption of a modified categorical approach instead.166 In 2012,
the Second Circuit decided Pennant v. Holder, in which the court
explained that the use of the modified categorical approach involves a
two-step inquiry: (1) the agency must consider whether the state
statute is divisible, and (2) “[i]f the statute is divisible, the agency
must proceed to the second step, ‘consult[ing] the record of conviction
to ascertain the category of conduct of which the alien was convicted.’ ” 167 Divisibility refers to some categories of proscribed conduct
within the provision that warrants removal.168 Upon this determination, courts may consider the record of conviction, charging document, and plea agreement to shed light onto the circumstances of
conviction that are necessary to determine whether the crime is aggravated, or whether it is even a felony that warrants removal.169 In
other words, if it is unclear on the face of the conviction whether the
noncitizen’s conduct was for an aggravated felony or for serious criminal misconduct, immigration judges should be able to go beyond the
record of conviction at the outset of immigration proceedings and
“look to the facts and circumstances underlying an offender’s conviction.”170 This would allow inquiry into the offense itself, rather than
163. See Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 34 (2009).
164. Id. at 37.
165. Bennett, supra note 124, at 1720.
166. See, e.g., Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 30-31 (supporting the categorical approach for
generic crimes but departing from that approach for the defendant’s conviction because of
certain elements required by the provision).
167. Pennant v. Holder, 494 F. App’x 169, 170 (2012) (quoting Lanferman v. BIA, 576
F.3d 84, 88-89 (2d Cir. 2009)).
168. See id.
169. See 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 1, § 71.05[2][b] n.450.1.
170. Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 34.
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just the language of the violated statute, which may have misleading
implications. Although this approach might delay the process, the
delay is worthwhile given the severity of the potential consequences
for the noncitizen. A modified categorical approach would promote a
fair determination of whether removal is an appropriate punishment
for the crime.
Although a modified categorical approach may solve the problem
of less serious offenses being punished too harshly, support for judicial discretion does not suggest that no misdemeanor can equate to
an aggravated felony. Where the nature of the offense does not constitute a felony and is not aggravated, the judge should have discretion to determine whether the noncitizen is eligible for relief. Yet, in
certain instances, aggravated felony treatment may be appropriate
for misdemeanors. For example, in Wireko v. Reno, a misdemeanor
sexual battery was characterized as an aggravated felony, because it
fell within the INA’s provision of a crime of violence for which the
term of imprisonment is at least one year.171 Wireko should be distinguished from the shoplifting conviction that was deemed an aggravated felony in Christopher. 172 It is more appropriate to categorize
misdemeanor sexual battery as an aggravated felony, because the
nature of this crime implies a threat to people. In order to prevent
serious consequences for all of the crimes included in the expansive
range of offenses reached by the aggravated felony statute, judges
should be allowed to order removal for violent crimes or sexually deviant crimes as aggravated felonies. However, judges should also
have the discretion to grant relief in cases where the offenses are
victimless crimes or nonviolent misdemeanors that pose less serious
threats to society.
Congress should eliminate mandatory removal without first requiring immigration judges to conduct an “individualized inquiry
that examines factors such as the noncitizen’s length of residence,
family ties, likelihood of rehabilitation, and conditions in the receiving country in order to determine whether removal is warranted.”173
Inquiring into this background information could better protect family unity for noncitizens convicted of crimes while ensuring justice.
Individualized inquiry could also effectively protect the U.S. community by requiring removal of noncitizens that pose the most serious
threats to society.174

171. See Wireko v. Reno, 211 F.3d 833, 835 (4th Cir. 2000).
172. United States v. Christopher, 239 F.3d 1191 (11th Cir. 2001).
173. Kohli, supra note 122, at 4.
174. Id. at 20 (“ICE attorneys and investigators could focus resources on those noncitizens who present a real threat to community safety, rather than individuals with minor
criminal histories.”).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The INA is a complex body of law governing the generally confusing area of immigration law. The INA has evolved since its inception
and continues to face challenges in light of recurring issues. Changes
to the INA have expanded the classes of offenses that may be categorized as aggravated felonies and eliminated judicial discretion to
grant relief to noncitizens. Moreover, changes to the INA have limited the Attorney General’s ability to cancel removal, leaving noncitizens convicted of aggravated felonies in danger of mandatory removal
with no opportunity for relief. The issue of which crimes constitute
aggravated felonies has been litigated extensively due to the harsh
penalties imposed upon those convicted of aggravated felonies. In
several cases, the Supreme Court realized the harsh consequences of
this classification and spared some offenses from aggravated felony
categorization. The Court’s decisions seem to encourage a revision of
legislative provisions and to improve the current state of immigration
law in favor of noncitizens. To avoid over-punishment, Congress
should narrow the classes of crimes that can be reached by the aggravated felony definition, or it should grant immigration judges
more discretion to consider which offenses appropriately follow the
letter of the law. The employment of a modified categorical approach
may be an effective way to balance congressional interests and the
rights of noncitizens. By allowing judges to inquire about circumstances surrounding the conviction and the noncitizen’s background,
a fair determination may be achieved as to whether or not a conviction warrants characterization as an aggravated felony.

